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MYTHICAL UNICORNS AND HOW TO FIND THEM:
THE DISCLOSURE REVOLUTION
Anat Alon-Beck*
John Livingstone**

ABSTRACT
Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) are widely used by unicorn
firms and venture-backed early stage startups. These structures are
used to take advantage of a loophole in our federal securities laws.
Both the firm and its investors benefit from this regulatory arbitrage. It
allows the firms to raise large amounts of capital and stay private
longer.
Venture capital (VC) investors use it to allocate more funds to
the startup firm, while also keeping the startup founders and select
preferred investors happy. It is a new form of a quid pro quo
transaction that allows VC investors to channel new investment
business back to their funds. Using SPVs, venture capitalists are
allowing select preferred clients to invest in privately held venture
backed firms directly. The select VC clients get access to direct
investment in “hot” private firms. These private firms are not open to
the general investing public, i.e., retail investors. Access to investments
in privately held firms, such as unicorns, is usually reserved to
accredited sophisticated investors, such as ultrarich individuals and
large institutions.
Accompanying these changes is the exposure of an increasing
amount of the public’s capital to riskier investments in a sphere where
information is unavailable in the best of times and deliberately hidden
in the worst.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

“Working people’s money should not be the play toys of a bunch of
idiots… There’s a lot of people in this who make a lot of money off of
just a lot of hoohah.”
-

The Hon. Leo Strine

Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) are popular again today and
widely used by unicorn firms and venture-backed early stage startups.
These structures are not new and were widely used in the buyout world.
The last time that SPVs made the financial news and came to the
public’s attention was during the post Enron-era. Enron used SPVs to
employ accounting fraud practices rather than traditional operating
results.1 Venture backed startups are now using them to take advantage
of a loophole in our federal securities laws, which allows them to raise
large amounts of capital and stay private longer.
How are SPVs used by unicorns today? In a typical SPV
transaction, the unicorn investors choose to invest directly in a single
venture-backed startup, rather than invest passively in a Venture
Capital (VC) fund. The investors form a Limited Liability Company
(LLC) for the specific purpose of holding direct investments in a
specific startup. The startup’s General Partners (GPs) are the ones that
will typically create and manage the SPV. The SPV is funded by the
Limited Partners (LPs) investors. This shift from passive to active
investing by LPs in venture backed firms has perhaps led to a veritable
democratization of venture capital.
This shift does not take place in a vacuum. Several
developments are affecting this change, including the increase of public
capital flowing into private markets. We have also observed a
fundamental shift in how traditional venture capital investors and their
new competitors behave. VC investors typically function as GPs
because they are better positioned to negotiate with startups and
investors, allowing the investors to invest more specifically and for
shorter periods of time in specific venture backed startup firms, thanks
in large part to the use of special purpose vehicles (“SPVs”).
This new practice can also be viewed as a new form of an
“abusive allocation practice” which is now used by VCs. In some ways,
1

Steven L. Schwartz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose
Entities
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it is akin to “IPO spinning” which is an abusive practice used by
investment banks to get clients to give them business in the future. IPO
spinning is a form of a quid pro quo transaction that allowed the
investment bank to channel investment banking business back to it.2 In
an IPO spinning arrangement, an investment bank “spins” or allocates
underpriced securities (prior to an IPO) to directors or executives of its
other clients. These preferred clients would make a lot of money
overnight by monetizing IPO underpricing.3
Using SPVs, venture capitalists are allowing select preferred
clients to invest in privately held venture backed firms directly. These
private firms are not open to the general investing public, i.e., retail
investors. Access to investments in privately held firms, such as
unicorns, is usually reserved to accredited sophisticated investors, such
as ultrarich individuals and large institutions.4 If things go well, these
select VC clients will be able to monetize on their investments as the
rounds of investing in the unicorn firm and valuations continue to
increase.
The increase in valuations of unicorn firms points to even
larger problems associated with the efficiency of our markets. As we
will discuss, there are legitimate concerns that unicorns and other large
private companies are dramatically overvalued. The loophole in US
securities laws contributes to the lack of disclosure which has allowed
this problem to escalate. With the increases in Section 12(g) limits, not
only are more companies staying private longer, but more companies
are deciding to “go dark”. The resulting shrinkage of public equity
markets may be leading to increased inefficiencies in our public market
valuations to go hand in hand with private market inefficiencies. While
there was hope with the creation of secondary markets to allow for
some liquidity, they remain largely inefficient and unable to address
the problem like disclosure would.5

SPVs have the added benefit of allowing the venture capital
funds themselves play outside the typical restrictions imposed upon
them by the funds’ investors. It also runs the risk of further
exacerbating the systemic inequality that the SEC seeks to address by
liberating private markets. As more venture capital funds sponsor more
2

For an analysis of spinning, see Sean J. Griffith, A Legal and
Economic Analysis of the Preferential Allocation of Shares in Initial
Public Offerings, 69 BROOKLYN L. REV. 583 (2003-2004).
3

For an analysis on underpricing, see Patrick Corrigan.
Beck, AVCs
5 See infra Section III.
4
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SPVs, they turn to their preferred clients to reward them first before
opening up to other potential investors. Relying on a hand collected
data set consisting of SEC public filings, we found that many
companies have substantially more beneficial owners than their
shareholder of record count would indicate otherwise.6
Situated in the center of this pool of problems is Section 12(g).
With the reality of ease of access to capital, companies can tap into
private capital directly and public capital indirectly without needing to
make disclosures. They reap the rewards while shifting away the risk.
By addressing the threshold requirements under Section 12(g), we
believe we can rebalance the equilibrium, provide the necessary
protection to investors, and continue to liberate the markets to allow for
a greater range of participation from a variety of sources.
Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“34
Act”) has been referred to as “an obscure provision” and increasingly
irrelevant for nearly two decades. Yet for all of its supposed
irrelevance, it was amended in 2012 via the Jumpstart Our Business
Startups Act (“JOBS Act”) to remove what little regulatory teeth it had
left. The result of the removal has been extraordinary changes in capital
formation in the last decade. Investors from a wide range of size and
sophistication are being pulled into financing rounds of increasing scale
while simultaneously less and lower quality information is being
disseminated from these firms. The delicate balancing act of our
securities laws between capital formation and investor protection has
dipped dramatically in favor of the former at the expense of the latter.
We believe Section 12(g) is at the center of this problem and the time
is ripe for reform.
Following these supposedly needed changes, and combined
with the other provisions of the JOBS Act, we have seen fundamental
shifts in how capital is raised and in the expected IPO cycles. Thanks
to the increase in Section 12(g) thresholds and the easing of exempt
capital raising restrictions under Regulation D, it is far easier for
companies to stay private longer and grow to staggering sizes. Using
our hand-collected data from public filings with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”), we have found the average number of
shareholders of record in unicorn IPOs has nearly doubled in the decade
since the passage of the JOBS Act. Valuations for unicorn IPOs have
continued to soar higher every year.
Given the implications of these large firms, it must be asked
whether the regulation requires updating, or rather a restoration, to
ensure that the original intent behind its passage is still actually being
6

See infra Section IV.
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addressed. In our opinion, it is failing dramatically. When implemented
in 1964 by Congress at the behest of the SEC, Section 12(g) was
intended to address companies which already had significant exposure
to the investing public, but were not required to comply with the typical
reporting regime associated with publicly trading. It was designed to
address widely held and widely traded private companies.
However, much has changed in the past six decades with
regards to how we own and trade securities, how information about
these securities is maintained, and the size and scale of companies. The
purpose behind all of our securities regulation, to protect investors and
allow for efficient allocation of capital by providing access to accurate
information, is unchanged. On the other hand, many of the provisions
implemented as a result of limitations in technology have not been
updated to reflect the modern features of our current market
environment.
The SEC is preparing to change this and demand more
transparency from large venture-backed technology firms valued at
over $1 billion or more, called “unicorns”.7 Regulators are concerned
with the lack of oversight of the private fundraising that has fueled the
rise of these firms.
The obvious question would be why should Section 12(g) be
reformed before any other regulation. Some would argue that targeting
the exemptions for unregistered offerings may have more of an impact.
In our view, however, Section 12(g) is squarely situated within the
middle of the problem: a loophole at the point at which capital
formation and investor protection clash. Its thresholds allow companies
to raise capital from large pools of investors, both public and private,
and avoid making the disclosures typically associated with such
formation activities. From the outset, it must be noted that our largest
concern stems from the increase in public capital, particularly from
pension funds and other retirement vessels, flowing into private
markets with few disclosure mechanisms in place to protect it. If the
SEC seeks to liberate access to participation in these private markets,
there must be at least a minimal consideration given to protective
measures. While we do not object to this liberation as we believe it may
be beneficial in addressing systemic economic inequality, it must be
done responsibly.

Paul Kiernan, SEC Pushes for More Transparency from Private Companies, WALL ST.
J. (Jan. 10, 2022) (“‘Unicorn’ firms have a huge impact and ‘absolutely no visibility’
for
regulators,
says
SEC
Commissioner
Allison
Lee”) https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-pushes-for-more-transparency-fromprivate-companies-11641752489.
7
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In addition to protecting public capital, minority shareholders
and later stage investors are also at significant risk should Section 12(g)
not be reformed. Employees, the largest group of minority
shareholders, do not have access to information normally provided by
disclosure mechanisms to allow them to assess both their economic
prospects and career options. Instead, they are faced with a blindfold to
go along with their “golden handcuffs”. Large investors who may be
late to the initial party are also faced with paying increasing prices for
less and less equity. Newer players in the world of capital formation
are using their capital earlier to protect their equity stakes contractually,
favoring rachets to save percentages, rather than addressing legitimate
corporate governance concerns. By the time more responsible and
traditional investors come in, their ability to address problems has been
diluted.8
The increase in valuations points to even larger problems
associated with the efficiency of our markets. As we will discuss, there
are legitimate concerns that unicorns and other large private companies
are dramatically overvalued. The lack of disclosure has allowed this
problem to escalate. With the increases in Section 12(g) limits, not only
are more companies staying private longer, but more companies are
deciding to “go dark”. The resulting shrinkage of public equity markets
may be leading to increased inefficiencies in our public market
valuations to go hand in hand with private market inefficiencies. While
there was hope with the creation of secondary markets to allow for
some liquidity, they remain largely inefficient and unable to address
the problem like disclosure would.9
With the increase of public capital flowing in, the increase in
risks to smaller investors, and the inefficiencies of public and private
markets increasing, we have also seen a fundamental shift in how
venture capital and its new competition behave. In some instances,
these shifts have led to a veritable democratization of venture capital.
VC investors better positioned to negotiate with funds, allowing them
to invest more specifically and for shorter periods of time, thanks in
large part to the use of special purpose vehicles (“SPVs”).
SPVs have the added benefit of allowing the venture capital
funds themselves play outside the typical restrictions imposed upon
them by the funds’ investors. It also runs the risk of further
exacerbating the systemic inequality that the SEC seeks to address by
liberating private markets. As more venture capital funds sponsor more
SPVs, they turn to their preferred clients to reward them first before
opening up to other potential investors. Relying on a hand collected
8
9

See infra Section III.
See infra Section V.
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data set consisting of SEC public filings, we found that many
companies have substantially more beneficial owners than their
shareholder of record count would indicate otherwise.10
Situated in the center of this pool of problems is Section 12(g).
With the reality of ease of access to capital, companies can tap into
private capital directly and public capital indirectly without needing to
make disclosures. They reap the rewards while shifting away the risk.
By addressing the threshold requirements under Section 12(g), we
believe we can rebalance the equilibrium, provide the necessary
protection to investors, and continue to liberate the markets to allow for
a greater range of participation from a variety of sources.
In Section II of this paper, we will examine how equity
ownership has been consolidated, both for purposes of record holding
and in reality, despite an overall increase in market participation as a
percentage of the population. While more Americans invest in equities,
both in volume and in value, there are fewer and fewer record holders
on paper. We will then examine how Section 12(g) is being
manipulated away from its original intent to ensure that disclosures that
should be made are being avoided.
We will discuss the legislative history of Section 12(g), a
history which would indicate the Congress which passed this provision
would have it dramatically updated to reflect modern technology. In
addition, we will examine how the SEC itself views Section 12(g) in
its own eyes, the practical limitations it sees on how the provision can
be enforced in the post-JOBS Act world, and how it and members of
academia have viewed the possibility for significant reform under the
SEC’s own rulemaking powers.
We will also address the dramatic increase in capital formation
resulting from the adjustments to Section 12(g) and other provisions of
our securities laws. This capital is stemming from a multitude of
sources with an increasing number of participants, but many are
excluded from regulatory counts.
In Section III, using our data set, we will examine the practical
effects of the combination of the factors from Section II. We will show
what has occurred as a result of the consolidation of equity ownership,
the explosion of exempt offerings in size and scale, and the reality of
near unenforceability of our existing securities law protections.
In Section IV, we will discuss the democratization of venture
capital, the new sources of funding, and the implications for receiving
10

See infra Section III.
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funds in unique structures. The impact of this evolution of capital
formation is, in large part, the reason we believe Section 12(g) needs
reformation. While capital formation is an admirable goal, investor
protection must not suffer for its benefit.
In Section V, we will show the results of allowing this capital
formation to happen largely in the dark and the implications of
maintaining a veil of secrecy over increasingly large companies. We
will then address why we believe the methodology for determining
“shareholders of record” should be adjusted.
Finally in Section VI, we present our suggested reforms for
returning Section 12(g) to its originally intended purpose. In doing so,
we will see a far more accurate reflection of the ownership of these
enterprises, thus requiring those who seek indirect access to the
investing public’s capital to comply with the same rules that those who
directly seek access must follow. While Congressional action is needed
for several of these reforms, the SEC, with its considerable own
rulemaking authority, has the ability to make changes to give Section
12(g) its regulatory teeth back.

II.

CLEARING THE “STREET” FOR PRIVATE GROWTH

When most investors purchase shares in a firm, they often make
the reasonable assumption that as beneficial owners their shares are
held in their name.11 They receive the dividends and proxy materials,
as well as retaining the right to vote the shares.12 However, the ultimate
named record holder for purposes of Section 12(g) counts is often the
brokerage firm the investor uses to purchase the shares or the
company.13 This standard procedure is known as “street name”
registration.

A.

Consolidation of Equity

There are obvious benefits for such a methodology of
ownership. It allows for investing practices many consider standard
today such as limit orders, borrowing on margin, and near instant

It’s Your Stock, Just Not in Your Name: Explaining ‘Street Names,’ FINRA (Financial
Industry
Regulatory
Authority)
(Dec.
21,
2015),
https://www.finra.org/investors/insights/its-your-stock-just-not-your-nameexplaining-street-names [hereinafter FINRA].
12 Holding Your Securities Get the Facts, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Mar. 4, 2003),
https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investorpublications/investorpubsholdsechtm.html.
13 Id.
11
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trading.14 It avoids the expensive and time consuming process of selling
physical shares, as well as avoiding the risks of losing the shares
themselves.15 While it does often delay the dispersal of dividends by a
few days, in the grand scheme, the benefits typically outweigh the risks.
As a result, purchases are typically automatically held in street name
unless specific investor instructions are given to the contrary.16
Issuers prefer this form of ownership for several reasons. First,
it places the onerous burden on the brokerage firms, or other nominated
parties, to send out proxy materials, provide tax information, and
distribute annual reports.17 More importantly for non-public issuers,
however, it allows for the record count in Section 12(g) to be
dramatically reduced. If 500 investors purchase shares through a single
brokerage firm, that firm reduces the record count to just one
shareholder of record.18
Since the passage of the ’34 Act and the Securities Act of 1933
(“’33 Act”), the ownership of public equity has shifted dramatically.
Prior to the end of World War II, institutional investors held around 5%
of equities in the United States.19 By 2010, that had increased to 67%.
In the decade that followed, the number has steadily risen.20 Of the 10
largest publicly traded companies, the average exceeds 75%.21
However, our securities laws have not adapted to reflect this reality.
While more and more Americans are investing their wealth into
equities, they are often doing so via vehicles such as mutual funds,
401(k)s, IRAs, and other institution-managed funds.22 For the
increasing minority that does hold shares outright, many do so via
brokerage funds.23 These funds are considered to be the shareholders

Id.
Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 “Going Dark” – A Process for Delisting and Deregistration of Public Company
Securities, DUDNICK, DETWILER, RIVIN AND STIKKER, LLP https://www.ddrs.com/goingdark-a-process-for-delisting-and-deregistration-of-public-company-securities/
(last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
19 Marshall E. Blume & Donald B. Keim, Institutional Investors and Stock Market
Liquidity: Trends and Relationships 4 (Aug. 21, 2012) (Jacobs Levy Equity
Management
Center
for
Quantitative
Financial
Research
Paper),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2147757.
20 Id.
21 80% of Equity Market Cap Held by Institutions, PENSIONS & INVS. (Apr. 25, 2017),
https://www.pionline.com/article/20170425/INTERACTIVE/170429926/80-ofequity-market-cap-held-by-institutions.
22 What Percentage of Americans Own Stock?, USA FACTS (Mar. 9, 2021),
https://usafacts.org/articles/what-percentage-of-americans-own-stock/.
23 Id.
14
15
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of record, holding the shares in their “street name” while the ultimate
benefit is given to the beneficial investors.24
Further complicating this matter is the rise of special purpose
vehicles (“SPV”), developed by sophisticated players ostensibly as
liability shielding mechanisms. As part of a fundraising round, a firm
may raise funds from several large investors. Rather than holding the
shares outright on their books, however, these investors may pool their
assets in a newly created special purpose vehicle. This SPV holds the
equity on behalf of the investors and provides a degree of liability
protection. Should the investee go under, the exposure is limited to the
SPV, rather than potentially having a broader exposure to the investors’
books. The added benefit stems from a further reduction in overall
shareholders of record for the investee company. It should be noted that
under the recently passed Corporate Transparency Act of 2021,
FinCEN is now required to create a registry of entities formed and
permitted to do business in the United States. This registry would
require beneficial owners of these entities who either exert substantial
control or own at least 25% of their equity to disclose their name and
other information to FinCEN. There are, however, 23 exceptions to
these requirements and FinCEN is still revising the proposed rule under
notice and comment rulemaking.
Finally, we have seen an increase in companies with multiple
classes of equity.25 The limits of Section 12(g) apply to each individual
class of equity, not the company as a whole.26 Provided the
shareholders approve the creation of a new class, the company could
very well avoid ever approaching the thresholds outlined below by
simply creating new classes of equity with different rights. This serves
the additional purposes of tailoring investments to the liquidation
option demands of large investors and allowing founders to more easily
maintain control.27
By using these multi-equity structures, founders of unicorn
firms are often able to control the board of directors allowing them to
maintain their positions within their own firms.28 Broughman and Fried
FINRA, supra note 2.
Rani Molla, More Tech Companies Are Selling Stock that Keeps Their Founders in
Power, VOX.COM (Apr. 11, 2019),https://www.vox.com/2019/4/11/18302102/ipovoting-multi-dual-stock-lyft-pinterest.
26 “The class of equity securities was held of record by fewer than 2,000 persons and
fewer than 500 of those persons were not accredited investors . . . .” Registration of
Securities; Exemption from Section 12(g), 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1.
27 See Anat Alon-Beck, Alternative Venture Capital: The New Unicorn Investors, 88
TENN. L. REV. 985 (2020).
28 See Alon-Beck, supra note 18. See Joann S. Lublin & Spencer E. Ante, A Fight in
Silicon Valley: Founders Push for Control, WALL ST. J., (July 11, 2012),
24
25
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further show that the ex-ante likelihood of founders reacquiring control
via IPO is extremely low, especially if we focus on control that is both
strong (founders have enough voting power to ensure they remain in
the saddle) and durable (control lasts at least three years).29
While beyond the subject of this paper, there remains
disagreement regarding how best to eliminate dual-class equity
structures. Regardless of this disagreement, institutional investors,
academics, and others have long agreed they need to be addressed and
their continued allowance remains a controversial subject. Even the key
policy makers within the SEC have expressed opposition to such
structures, including former Commissioner Robert J. Jackson, Jr.30 and
Rick Fleming, Director of the Office of the Investor Advocate.31
Commissioner Jackson noted that while the vast majority of companies
going public fail to include dual class structures, of those that do,
“nearly half… gave corporate insiders outsized voting rights in
perpetuity,” requiring investors to not just trust visionary founders, but
their descendants as well.32 However, this number of companies is
growing according to data compiled by Jay Ritter.33 Controllers face
little of the negative risks for their actions while remaining well
insulated from the “disciplinary force of the market” which they would
face should they lack voting control.34
There is even evidence to suggest that dynastic ownership of
firms leads to underperformance relative to other firms.35 An empirical
study of dual-class companies, published after Commissioner
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230329220457751913416824
0 (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review). According to Broughman and
Fried, however, only fifteen percent of VC-backed IPOs from 2010 to 2012 were dual
class. Brian J. Broughman & Jesse M. Fried, Do Founders Control Start-Up Firms That
Go Public? 10 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 49, 64 tbl.2 (2020).
29 Broughman & Fried, supra note 19.
30 Robert J. Jackson Jr., Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Perpetual Dual-Class Stock: The
Case Against Corporate Royalty, Remarks at University of California, Berkley (Feb.
15, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/perpetual-dual-class-stock-caseagainst-corporate-royalty.
31 Rick Fleming, Dir. of the Office of the Inv’r Advocate, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, DualClass Shares: A Recipe For Disaster, Remarks at ICGN Miami Conference, Miami
Florida (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/fleming-dual-classshares-recipe-disaster.
32 Jackson, supra note 21, at par. 16-17. See Lucien A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The
Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock, 103 VA. L. REV. 594, 606 (2017)
(“Furthermore, dual-stock structures may enable the transfer of a lock on control to
an heir of the founder, who might not be as able, talented, skilled or driven as her
predecessor. This problem is known in the economic literature as the problem of the
‘idiot heir.’”).
33
See Jay Ritter, Initial Public Offerings: Dual Class Structure of IPOs Through 2021,
https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/IPOs-Dual-Class.pdf
34 Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 23, at 602.
35 Id. at 606.
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Jackson’s remarks, by Bebchuk and Kastiel, found that in over 80% of
firms with such a structure, controllers needed less than a 10% equity
stake to maintain their control over these firms, with many requiring
less than 5%.36 Fleming argued that dual-class structures may result in
a “wave of companies with weak corporate governance” and force
investors into the same game as “late-stage venture capitalists…willing
to pay astronomical sums while ceding astonishing amounts of control
to founders.”37

B.

Disclosure Arbitrage

The fundamental purpose of our regulatory regime is to ensure
that the reasonable investor is equipped with sufficient knowledge to
make informed investment decisions.38 Regulators like the SEC,
however, must balance this purpose with the reality that companies
require some degree of secrecy over their operations in order to grow,
function, and innovate effectively. As Congress acknowledged when
passing the initial iteration of Section 12(g), when a company has
crossed the set limits, the likelihood of exposure to the public is enough
to offset the potential privacy concerns of the company.39
If a company goes over the threshold, it is sufficiently exposed
to public capital normally only available to a company complying with
the disclosure regime. In establishing this threshold, Congress, based
on the limitations of available technology at the time of legislation,
attempted to provide investor protection by including securities that
were already trading over the counter in the scope of the SEC's
reporting requirements .40 Section 12(g) has been called obsolete in
substance, but in reality, the methodology of using these thresholds to
define exposure is the true obsolescence. The underlying purpose in

Lucian A. Bebcuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Perils of Small-Minority Controllers, 107 GEO.
L.J. 1453, 1457 (2018).
37 Fleming, supra note 22, at par. 11.
38 See generally Section 2, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 15 U.S.C. § 78b. See also
The
Laws
that
Govern
the
Securities
Industry,
INVESTOR.GOV
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/role-sec/lawsgovern-securities-industry (last visited Jan. 24. 2022).
39
Usha Rodrigues, The Once and Future Irrelevancy of Section 12(g), 2015 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1529, 1532-33 (2015) (citing Allen Ferrell, Mandatory Disclosure and Stock
Returns: Evidence from the Over-the-Counter Market, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 213, 219-22
(2007)); Richard M. Phillips & Morgan Shipman, An Analysis of the Securities Acts
Amendments of 1964, 1964 DUKE L.J. 706, 706 (1964) (“The main feature
of this portion is an extension of the registration, periodic reporting, proxy and insider
trading provisions of sections 12, 13, 14, and 16 of the Exchange Act to larger over-thecounter companies. These provisions were formerly applicable only to listed
companies.”).
40 Rodrigues, supra note 30, at 1533-34.
36
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passing such a threshold is still very much relevant. But the ability to
largely ignore the limits has removed any regulatory strength from it.
If we are expected to accept reasoning for provisions based
solely on the intent of Congress in choosing to implement the limits in
the form in which they did, we must also acknowledge the intent of
Congress passing the whole statute in the first place. If these do not
complement each other, it is only logical to place the statute’s purpose
above the purpose of the constrained methodology available to
Congress at the time of passage. At the time of the passage of Section
12(g) in 1964, the SEC and Congress conceded that setting the limits
based on shareholders of record was only a “rough, indirect measure of
activity.”41 Any other method available to them at the time of
measuring “market activity” was not feasible, meaningful, or
workable.42 The SEC further noted that shareholders of record is “the
most direct and simple criterion of public-investor interest.”
As Rodrigues points out, Congress “never intended for the
provision to have the effect of forcing illiquid private companies into
making public disclosures” but rather bringing companies which were
already trading via over-the-counter (“OTC”) markets into the public
reporting sphere.43 Companies were trading on these then-unregulated
markets at increasing rates without oversight and the protections
afforded to investors by our securities laws. Retail investors were at
significant risk of exposure to investments which may or may not have
been riskier. At the time of the passage of Section 12(g) in 1964, the
OTC markets had grown to nearly 61% of the trading volume of
national exchanges, but received none of the investor protections
associated with them.44
However, in 1999, Congress forced nearly all OTC traded firms
to make at least a bare minimum of public disclosures. For many, this
was viewed as the point of irrelevancy for Section 12(g). Indeed,
between 2000 and the passage of the new limits under the JOBS Act,
less than 3% of firms which went public were over 400 shareholders
and thus approaching the upper limits.45 There is also no indication that
the majority of these firms went public for the sole reason that they
were approaching, or in the case of some, exceeding these limits. As
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N., SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc.
No. 88-95, at 34 (1964).
42 Id.
43 Rodrigues, supra note 30, at 1534; see also William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Questioning the
500 Equity Holders Trigger, 1 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. Online 43, 44-45 (2011) (highlighting
that the 1964 amendments were targeted at issuers with sufficiently liquid shares).
44 S. REP. NO. 88-379, at 14 (1963).
45 Rodrigues, supra note 30, at 1547.
41
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we will discuss in Section V, there are a multitude of reasons for
completing an IPO.
All of this then begs the question of if Section 12(g) is “largely
irrelevant” or “an obscure provision of securities laws”46, why change
the thresholds at all? To answer this, we must examine the intent behind
the change and its ultimate effects.
While the intent was to allow widely held, but seldom traded
companies continue to avoid the high costs associated with the
mandatory disclosure regime, the ultimate effect has been far broader.
With the explosion of unicorns in the decade since the passage of the
JOBS Act, it is logical to draw a correlation between the updates to
various securities law provisions, including Section 12(g), and these
firms’ growth.
These companies will continue to be able to raise even more
capital and remain private if the law is not updated. As noted by de
Fontaney, “There is no evidence that capital is scarce today for good
U.S. firms—whether public or private—and much evidence to the
contrary.”47 The reality is that traditional investors in private markets,
VCs and PEs, are competing with non-traditional investors over
investments in unicorn firms.48 As a result, rather than firms competing
over a limited pool of funding, investors are competing over a limited
group of investee companies.
The changes, accompanied by more recent changes to rules on
the solicitation of 401(k) funds by hedge funds also encouraged more
investors, which include non-accredited investors, to join traditional

46 John Markoff, Google Flirts; Investors Wonder About Date,

N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2004,
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/24/business/google-flirts-investors-wonderabout-date.html.
47 Examining Private Market Exemptions as a Barrier to IPOs and Retail Investment:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Inv. Prot., Entrepreneurship, & Cap. Mkts. of the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 116th Cong. 13 (2019) (written testimony of Elisabeth de
Fontenay, Professor of Law, Duke University.
48 It should be noted that there is a distinction between an innovation driven
entrepreneurial firm and a small medium business enterprise. This article will only
address policy with regards to unicorns, which are large innovation driven
enterprises. For more, see Anat Alon-Beck, The Coalition Model, A Private-Public
Strategic Innovation Policy Model for Encouraging Entrepreneurship and Economic
Growth in the Era of New Economic Challenges, 17 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 267
(2018); see also William Aulet & Fiona Murray, A Tale of Two Entrepreneurs:
Understanding Differences in the Types of Entrepreneurship in the Economy (May 1,
20113), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2259740 (on the
difference between the two definitions).
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and non-traditional groups and invest in private markets.49 However,
private markets do not offer the same protections and disclosure of
information as public markets. Given the risks associated with
investing in private firms, it is only logical that there should be
additional investor protections, not less.
SEC Commissioner Alison Lee also expressed reservation
about these developments, and stated that “These proposed changes all
go in one policy direction—toward expanding the pool of investors in
the opaque, and indisputably high-risk, private markets.”50 Former SEC
Commissioner Robert Jackson also suggested that we need to
adequately analyze the relevant data prior to expanding these
definitions and changing our laws.51

C.

Practical Enforcement and Modernization

Under Section 504 of the JOBS Act, the SEC was required to
commission a study to study its authority and ability to enforce the
limits imposed by Section 12(g) and the related Rule 12g5-1. Of
particular concern to Congress was the ability of the SEC to enforce
ethe anti-evasion provision included in Rule 12g5-1(b)(3). This
subsection requires number of beneficial owners to be used as the
record count if an issuer knows or has reason to know that the manner
of holding an issuer’s securities is used primarily to circumvent Section
12(g).
We must acknowledge that there is debate on whether or not the
SEC on its own rulemaking authority has the ability to redefine the term
“held of record”. Some cite to parts of the legislative history of Section
12(g) and the interpretation of securities law provisions in the years
since its passage to argue that only Congress retains the power to
redefine this. In particular, proponents of this position cite to the
attempts in 2012 by Democrats to insert into the JOBS Act provisions
explicitly authorizing the SEC to make the necessary changes without
Paul Kiernan, SEC Gives More Investors Access to Private Equity, Hedge Funds, Wall
St. J. (Aug 26, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-gives-more-investorsaccess-to-private-equity-hedge-funds-11598452858.
50 Allison Herren Lee, Statement by Commissioner Lee on Proposed Expansion of the
Accredited Investor Definition, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dec. 20, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/12/20/statement-by-commissioner-leeon-proposed-expansion-of-the-accredited-investor-definition/. Commissioner Lee
criticized the final rule for weakening investor protection (especially for seniors),
and for failing to index for inflation going forward.
51 Robert J. Jackson Jr., Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on Reducing
Investor
Protections
Around
Private
Markets
(Dec.
18,
2019),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-jackson-2019-12-18accredited-investor.
49
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congressional approval.52 Republicans opposed this by arguing only
Congress should have the exclusive discretion. However, this debate
does not point in one direction or the other. If, as we believe, the SEC
retained this power before the passage of the JOBS Act, Congress need
not have passed any statute granting them a power which they already
had. Some of the opponents of the explicit authorization even conceded
they believed the SEC already had the authority, with Republican
Congressman David Schweikert stating he does when asked if he
believed “the SEC [was] currently empowered to take these actions on
their own without Congressional approval.”53 He would later backtrack
his statements by saying if the SEC does have this authority, Congress
should be responsible for the ultimate policy and thus actually retains
the authority.54
For those of us who live in the real world, there is strong
evidence to suggest the SEC does, in fact, have this authority. If we
examine the SEC’s powers before the inconclusive debate in 2012, the
key provision to consider is Section 36 of the ’34 Act. Passed in 1996,
it provides the SEC with expansive general exemptive authority to
permit rulemaking to the extent that it is “necessary or appropriate in
the public interest, and is consistent with the protection of investors.”
Professor George Georgiev argues this indicates the SEC’s authority to
redefine “held of record” is “beyond question,” even if he believes it
may be practically infeasible.55 A similar position was adopted by Tyler
Gellasch and Lee Reiners at Duke’s Global Financial Markets Center.56
In it, they argued revisiting the shareholder of record interpretation is
necessary to bring the United States on bar with how other jurisdictions
bring large companies into the reporting sphere.57
David Langevoort and Robert Thompson argue the SEC could
presumably change the rule, citing back to a proposed rulemaking
change in 2006.58 They go on to argue that the better test for

52

Alexander I. Platt, Legal Guardrails for a Unicorn Crackdown, 10 (2022)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4033857
53
158 Cong. Rec. H1280 (Mar. 8, 2012).
54
Id. at H1281. “If you are with us and agree, we’re literally looking at two
tracks here. The SEC does hold authority. At the same time, we also want this
brought back to us if the SEC does see an issue. That’s proper venue.”
55
George S. Georgiev, The Breakdown of the Public-Private Divide in
Securities Law: Causes, Consequences, and Reforms, 18 NYU J.L. & Bus. 221,
302. (2021)
56
Tyler Gellash and Lee Reiners, From Laggard to Leader: Updating the
Securities Regulatory Framework to Better Meet the Needs of Investors and
Society, 11 (2021)
57
Id.
58
David Langevoort and Robert Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary
Securities Regulation, 101 Georgetown LJ 337, 359 (2013). Citing SEC
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“publicness” should not be record ownership, but rather a metric like
average daily trading volumes is better for the purposes of “gauging the
extent of investor interest in and need for disclosure.59 They also note
that such information is already collected via monthly disclosures as
required under existing SEC rules.60
Finally, the SEC itself believes it has the authority to do so.
When such changes were initially proposed by Commission Allison
Herren Lee, she suggested that it should be done under the SEC’s
rulemaking authority.61 In the SEC report written as required under
Section 504 of the JOBS Act, the SEC noted it “has the authority under
Exchange Act Section 12(g)(5) to define the term “held of record” as it
deems “necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors in order to prevent circumvention of the
provisions” of Section 12(g).”62 They also noted, in the same report,
that immobilized record ownership came about in “the late 1960s and
early 1970s”, after the initial passage of Section 12(g). In 1964, 23.7%
of shares were held in street name. By 1975, this number has risen to
28.6% and by 2010, the SEC estimated this number had risen to over
85%.

D.

Exempt Offerings

The ability to raise large amounts of capital affects the unicorn
firm. Unicorns are no longer dependent on an IPO (or trade sale) to
raise sufficient capital.63 Thanks to alternative venture capitalists
(“AVCs”), unicorn founders are able to raise large amounts of money
Advisory Comm. on Smaller Pub. Cos., Final Report 76-80 (2006) available at
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acspc/acspc-finalreport_d.pdf
59
Id. at 359-360
60
Id. at 360, citing 17 C.F.R. 242.302(b).
61
Supra note 217.
62
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N. REPORT ON AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE
EXCHANGE ACT RULE 12G5-1 AND SUBSECTION (B)(3), 7 (Oct. 15, 2012).
https://www.sec.gov/files/authority-to-enforce-rule-12g5-1.pdf
63 Les Brorsen, Looking Behind the Declining Number of Public Companies, HARV. L.
SCH.
F.
ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE
(May
18,
2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/18/looking-behind-the-decliningnumber-of-public-companies/; see Josh Lerner et al., Mutual Funds as Venture
Capitalists? Evidence from Unicorns (Euro. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No.
675, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2897254; MCKINSEY & CO., MCKINSEY GLOBAL
PRIVATE MARKET REVIEW 2018, THE RISE AND RISE OF PRIVATE MARKETS (2018),
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/Private%20Equity%
20and%20Principal%20Investors/Our%20Insights/The%20rise%20and%20rise
%20of%20private%20equity/The-rise-and-rise-of-private-markets-McKinseyGlobal-Private-Markets-Review-2018.ashx (Feb. 2018); Matt Levine, The Unicorn
Stampede
is
Coming,
BLOOMBERG
OP.
(Mar.
22,
2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-03-22/the-unicornstampede-is-coming.
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in mega deals, push their companies to stay private longer than eleven
years,64 negotiate contractual “founder friendly” terms and maintain
control over the management of the firm.65
If we compare the IPOs of “old” successful startups, for
example, Apple,66 Amazon,67 Google68 or Facebook,69 and the IPOs of
unicorns, such as Uber, we will find many differences. These
differences include valuations, growth periods, revenue expansions,
timeline to IPO, and capital raising methods.
Unicorns are able to raise large amounts of capital from AVCs
by relying on exemptions from registration with the SEC. According to
federal and state securities laws, any offer or sale of securities is subject
to registration, unless there are exemptions from registration.70
Registered offerings are subject to comprehensive disclosure
requirements,71 higher compliance costs, and provide access to a broad
group of potential investors.72
A series of reforms to the federal securities laws, which began
about fifteen years ago,73 provide exemptions from the old registration
See Sungjoung Kwon, Michelle Lowry & Yiming Qian, Mutual Fund Investments in
Private Firms, 136 J. FIN. ECON. 407 (2020). Kwon et al. further show that these large
amounts of capital “should enable the companies to stay private longer.” Id. at 408.
65 See infra Section II discussing “founder friendly” terms.
66 See Alex Wilhelm, A Look Back in IPO: Apple, the Early PC Purveyor, TECHCRUNCH
(Sept. 15, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/09/15/a-look-back-in-ipo-applethe-early-pc-purveyor/.
67 Amazon’s IPO was in 1997. See Alex Wilhelm, A Look Back in IPO: Amazon’s 1997
Move, TECHCRUNCH (June 28, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/28/a-lookback-at-amazons-1997-ipo/?_ga=2.187316328.1573799404.155854954998431006.1558549549.
68 Alex Wilhelm, A Look Back in IPO: Google, the Profit Machine, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 1,
2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/07/31/a-look-back-in-ipo-google-the-profitmachine/.
69 Alex Wilhelm, A Look Back in IPO: Facebook’s Trailing Profit and Mobile Intrigue,
TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 22, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/08/22/a-look-back-inipo-facebooks-trailing-profit-and-mobileintrigue/?_ga=2.76050645.1993016262.1558632407-1496323933.1558632407.
70 There is a debate on whether it contributed to the reduction of information
asymmetry and agency costs. See Darian Ibrahim, Public or Private Venture Capital,
94 WASH. L. REV. 1137, 1144 (2019) (“Mandatory disclosure reduces the costs of
acquiring information by forcing corporations to release it to the markets at pre-set
times”); see also Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of
Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 716, 738 (2006).
71 See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1076 (1995).
72 See EVA SU, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45221, CAPITAL MARKETS, SECURITIES OFFERINGS, AND
RELATED POLICY ISSUES 3 (2018).
73 See Examining Private Market Exemptions as a Barrier to IPOs and Retail
Investment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Inv. Prot., Entrepreneurship, and Cap.
Mkts. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 116th Cong. 10 (2019) (written testimony of
64
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requirements.74 The main legislative efforts that allow companies to
use exemptions are the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012
(“JOBS Act”), the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act of
2015 (the “FAST Act”) and the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief,
and Consumer Protection Act of 2018 (the “Economic Growth Act”).75
These were in addition to the passage of the National Securities
Markets Improvement Act (“NSMIA”) in 1996, which was passed with
the aim of simplifying securities regulation by significantly curtailing
the scope of state blue sky laws.
A private placement (private offering or unregistered offering)
is an offering of securities to potential investors, which is exempt from
registration with the SEC and is not subject to broad disclosure
requirements. As noted, the Securities Act provides a number of
exemptions from registration.76 Investors most frequently use
exemptions from registration applicable to private placements are
contained in Section 506, under Regulation D of the Securities Act.77
According to a concept release by the SEC,78 in 2018 companies raised
Renee M. Jones, Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Boston
College Law School [hereinafter Jones, Written Testimony].
74 Id.
75 For more on these Acts, see Anat Alon-Beck, Unicorn Stock Options—Golden Goose
or Trojan Horse?, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 107 (2019). See also Press Release, U.S. Sec.
& Exch. Comm’n, SEC Seeks Public Comment on Ways to Harmonize Private
Securities Offering Exemptions (June 18, 2019). The other legislations are: 1. The
Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, which includes modernizing the Regulation D offering
process and creates the “venture exchanges.” 2. Crowdfunding regulations that were
adopted by the SEC, which allow companies to use a crowdfunding platform
(intermediary) for raising small amounts of equity capital (less than $1 million
annually) from potentially large pools of investors over the internet. See Joan M.
Heminway, Securities Crowdfunding and Investor Protection (Univ. of Tenn. Legal
Studies
Research
Paper
No.
292,
2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2810757. 3. Offerings under
Regulation A+ of Title IV of the JOBS Act (Reg A+), which increased a private
company’s ability to make unregistered public offerings to a maximum of $50 million
to the public in any twelve-month period.
76 Section 3 of the Securities Act identifies classes of securities that are exempt from
the registration requirements. 15 U.S.C. § 77c. Section 4 of the Securities Act
identifies a number of transactions that are exempt from the registration
requirements. 15 U.S.C. § 7d. Both public and private companies can use
unregistered offerings (private placements) to raise funds from investors. This
Article will focus on offerings made by private companies and their investors.
77
See
Rule
506
of
Regulation
D,
INVESTOR.GOV,
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/glossary/rule506-regulation-d (last visited Jan. 24, 2022); see also Abraham J. Cable, Fending for
Themselves: Why Securities Regulations Should Encourage Angel Groups, 13 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 107, 132 (2010); Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Wreck of Regulation D: The
Unintended (and Bad) Consequences for the SEC’s Crown Jewel Exemptions, 7 OHIO ST.
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 287, 295 (2012); Ibrahim, supra note 50, at 1162.
78 See Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions,
Securities Act Release No. 10649, Exchange Act Release No. 86192, Investment
Company Act Release No. 33512, 84 Fed. Reg. 30,460, 30,466 tbl.2 (June 26, 2019).
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$1,500 billion using Rule 506(b) of Regulation D, 79 and $211 billion
using Rule 506(c) of Regulation D.
The policymakers’ intention and rationale behind the JOBS Act
was to facilitate the emerging growth companies’ “access to the public
capital markets.”80 The Act reduced SOX regulatory requirements in
the hopes of encouraging private companies to go public.81 However,
the JOBS Act’s biggest achievement is “radical deregulation.”82 The
exemption allows private firms to keep material information private
longer, as they are now required to disclose according to the federal
periodic disclosure requirements.83 Thanks to the JOBS Act, the
threshold that triggered registration with the SEC has changed.84

III.

THE EFFECTS OF 10 YEARS IN THE WILD WEST

The original intent behind instituting limits on shareholders of
record was to capture firms which already broadly trading. This
methodology for limitation was chosen, however, merely as a
compromise based on the limitations of implementable solutions. With
the technology available today, these limitations no longer exist. It is
relatively easy to calculate the volume of trading across markets of
even private companies. While the thresholds were ostensibly raised to
address concerns by widely held, but seldom traded companies, the

See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b) (2016).
See Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law's Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389
(2013); Robert B. Thompson & Thomas C. Langevoort, Rewarding the Public-Private
Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1573 (2013); see
also Paul Rose & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Where Have All the IPOs Gone? The Hard
Life of the Small IPO, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 83, 84 (2016); Usha Rodrigues, The JOBS Act
at Work, CONGLOMERATE (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.theconglomerate.org/jobsact/ (criticizing the JOBS Act’s unrealistic endeavors to boost IPOs).
81 According to Rose and Solomon, “The JOBS Act is primarily a response to the
regulatory theory, but also takes some aims towards market structure by loosening
restrictions on research analysts.” Rose & Solomon, supra note 60, at 85.
82 See Examining Investor Risks in Capital Raising: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Sec., Ins., and Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong.
(2011); see also Michael D. Gutentag, Patching a Hole in the JOBS Act: How and Why
to Rewrite the Rules that Require Firms to Make Periodic Disclosures, 88 IND. L. J. 151,
175 (2013).
83 See Gutentag, supra note 62, at 152.
84 Morrison Foerster, Late Stage Financings Presentation (Apr. 26-27, 2016),
https://media2.mofo.com/documents/160426latestagefinancings.pdf.
(“[T]he
JOBS Act related changes affecting the private market may be more significant[:]
Title V and Title VI changes to the Exchange Act Section 12(g) threshold[,] Changes
to Rule 506[, and] Legal certainty for matchmaking platforms.”). For more, see Anna
Pinedo, Late Stage Financings Presentation (Apr. 26–27, 2016)
https://media2.mofo.com/documents/160426latestagefinancings.pdf.
79
80
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practical effect was to shield these companies as well as companies
trading at higher volumes.
By redefining shareholders of record into a term more akin to
beneficial owners, but placing limits in place for trading volume, we
can restore Section 12(g) to its original intent of protecting investors
while not punishing companies for dispersing their equity
simultaneously. In addition, rather than slowing capital formation, it
will encourage companies to turn to the public markets for necessary
capital, allowing for more investors to engage in a broader range of
companies. Instead of allowing for companies to remain illiquid, but
continue to grow, companies will stand on their own merits and provide
their shareholders, especially employees, an ability to have and make
more informed investment decisions.
We examined whether firms are instituting any limits on
shareholders of record. Relying on a hand collected data set consisting
of SEC public filings, we found that many companies have
substantially more beneficial owners than their shareholder of record
count would indicate otherwise.
Percentage of IPOs with F-1/S-1/S-4s Containing Beneficial
Owner Language
25.000%

20.000%
15.000%
10.000%
5.000%

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021

0.000%

Table 1: Percentage of IPOs with F-1/S-1/S-4s Containing
Beneficial Owner Language
In prospectuses filed with the SEC, companies began inserting
the provision outlined below. The provision had no legal effect but did
acknowledge in a public filing that companies are aware of several key
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facts. First, they have substantially more beneficial owners than their
shareholder of record count would indicate. When viewed within the
context of an S-1 or S-4, it also indicates that they know precisely who
these shareholders are, their present equity holdings in the company,
and how to contact them to deliver the requisite materials needed to
vote on such transactions.
The earliest example of such a provision was found in 2005. In
the 12 years before the passage of the JOBS Act, it was found in a total
of 11 unique companies’ filings. After the passage of the JOBS Act,
this number increased an average of 49 unique companies annually.
This chart represents the percentage of IPO which had prospectuses or
merger proxies (S-1, F-1, or S-4) containing such a statement.
Example provision from Linkedin’s S-1 (pre-JOBS Act)
“As of September 30, 2011, we had 22 holders of record of our
Class A common stock and 571 holders of record of our Class B
common stock. The actual number of stockholders is greater than this
number of record holders, and includes stockholders who are beneficial
owners, but whose shares are held in street name by brokers and other
nominees. The number of holders of record also does not include
stockholders whose shares may be held in trust by other entities.”

Unicorn IPO Shareholders of Record by Year 2011-2021
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Table 2: Unicorn IPO Shareholders of Record by Year - 20112021
This table represents the number of shareholders of record of
the largest classes of equity in unicorn IPOs immediately before and in
the decade since the passage of the JOBS Act. The black lines represent
the previous 500 shareholder of record threshold and its new level at
2,000 following Section 12(g)’s amendment. The red line is a linear
trendline based on the data.
The table in Appendix A below represents the raw data points
presented visually above. Any red highlighted box denotes a company
which went public in violation of the Section 12(g) thresholds at the
time of its S-1 filing. Any orange highlighted box denotes a company
which has gone public since the passage of the JOBS Act and would be
in violation of the previous 500 shareholder of record limit.

IV.

DEMOCRATIZING VENTURE CAPITAL

Methods of raising capital can be very different depending on
the firm and the market conditions. An early startup usually
experiences challenges in raising capital for the following reasons.85
The firm’s internal cash flow is not enough to support its needs,
including operational expansions and employee recruitment and
retainment.86 It cannot support the firm’s fast growing technology,
research and development needs, which are comprised of intangible
assets.87 If the firm is not able to obtain an injection of new capital, it
will likely go bankrupt.88 This is not the case for the mature wealthy
startup—the unicorn firm.89

A.

Venture Capital

Over the last 30 years, academic literature has focused on VCs
as the main source of financing for private startups.90 There is no agreed
Ola Bengtsson & John R.M. Hand, CEO Compensation in Venture Capital Markets
(2008), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1079993.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 See Alon-Beck, supra note 55, for the features of a unicorn for this Article.
How Unicorns Grow, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2016, at 28–30,
https://hbr.org/2016/01/how-unicorns-grow (“Firms founded from 2012 to 2015
had a time to market cap more than twice that of firms founded from 2000 to 2003.”).
90
See Paul Gompers, William Gornall, Steven N. Kaplan & Ilya A. Strebulaev, How Do
Venture Capitalists Make Decisions? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 22587, 2016).
85
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upon definition on what is a VC fund.91 A VC firm is a type of
investment vehicle that invests in startups. VCs are repeat players in
the startup world, who use unique contracts and organizational
capabilities in order to overcome uncertainty, risk, information
asymmetry, agency,92 “lemons” and “adverse selection”93 related
problems. VC financing has prevailed since the early days of
commercial activity in various forms.94
Georges Doriot, a Harvard Business Professor, is the founding
father of the VC industry.95 He established the first public VC firm American Research and Development Corporation (“ARD”), after
World War II. 96 The ARD legal structure is no longer popular today
and has led to its demise,97 but its initial success influenced modern VC
as we know it today. According to Korsmo, “VCs diverge sharply from
the typical conception of the stockholder in a public corporation.”98
ARD’s fame came from the successful $70,000 investment in Digital
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Equipment Corporation (“DEC”), which following DEC’s IPO in
1968, made ARD $355 million.99
The VC industry has played, and continues to play, an
important role in the U.S. innovation process for the following
reasons.100 First, VCs are active investors, who provide many value
added services to the technology companies that they invest in. Such
services can vary, and include: strategic planning, mentoring, guidance,
selecting management, lawyers, accountants, writing a business plan,
etc.101 Second, VCs are fundamental to the formation of startup
firms.102 Third, VCs are actively engaged with the following innovation
networks: global as well as local technology markets,103 financial
institutions,104 specialized labor markets105 and professional business
service markets.106 Finally, VC investment spurs more technological
innovation than other investments.107

B.

Alternative Venture Capital

Alternative investments in the U.S. market are up from around
40% a decade ago.108 It seems that there is an endless supply of private
money from AVC investors, who are willing to line up to fund
unicorns. To highlight the dramatic change in the market, note that the
largest proportion of deals (almost 60%) in the VC industry in 2019
involved AVC investors.109
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In the past four years, at least one alternative investor has
invested in the reported 2,000 completed VC financing rounds.110
Furthermore, SoftBank, the Japanese telecom giant, which currently
holds the largest tech investment fund in the market and in history, the
$100 billion Vision Fund,111 is credited for pushing the deal sizes
upwards.112 Investments from corporate venture capital funds (“CVCs”
has jumped dramatically, with $41.2 billion being invested last year
alone. Sovereign Wealth Funds (“SWFs”) are also entering into the
market. With an estimated $9 trillion in assets under management, they
have considerable capital to deploy.
Historically, the traditional exit mechanism for investors in
private firms was limited to an IPO or a trade sale.113 Private company
investors dealt with extreme “lock-in” of their capital due to the
illiquidity of their stock. 114 Due to the prolonged timeline to IPO or
trade sale, which is now longer than eleven years,115 new liquidity
practices were developed to allow unicorn shareholders, such as
employees and early investors, to liquidate their investments as an
alternative to the traditional exit mechanisms.116
These new practices include secondary sales, structured
liquidity programs (private tender offers) and other liquidity
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alternatives.117 They are often used by existing shareholders (investors
and employees) as a third exit option.118 They involve specific
contractual arrangements between the various participants, including
investors with divergent rights and privileges.
Unicorn shares are non-liquid financial assets. Whether there is
an active market to trade these securities or not depends on the share
purchase agreement. Some unicorns allow investors to trade their
shares on secondary markets, but many put restrictions and do not allow
trading for compliance with securities laws.
Alternative investors are now able to invest in unicorn firms
thanks to the development of new dynamic secondary markets.119 It
should be noted that secondary transactions were common in the
private equity industry but not within the VC industry.120 Many
unicorn firms develop new liquidity alternatives because of the
prolonged timeline to IPO or trade sale, which is now longer than
eleven years.121
Liquidity practices can allow unicorn shareholders, such as
employees and early investors, to liquidate their investments as an
alternative to the traditional exit mechanisms.122 These new practices
include secondary sales, structured liquidity programs (private tender
offers) and other liquidity alternatives.123
These alternatives aim to allow shareholders to gain liquidity,
while allowing founders to maintain control124 over the management of
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their company.125 The development of electronic secondary markets
increases liquidity for individual investors but has also raised several
legal issues for the issuers. A number of unicorns allow their employees
and capital investors to sell their shares on secondary markets, using
electronic platforms such as NASDAQ Private Market (formerly
SecondMarket) and SharesPost.126
There are advantages and disadvantages to this new
development. On the one hand, the “direct market is improving the
liquidity of start-up stocks for locked-in investors by lowering these
transaction costs.”127 On the other, these markets can expose nonaccredited investors to risks and uncertainties, due to current
contractual arrangements, securities and tax laws.128 Both the sellers of
the shares (investors or employees) and the unicorn are subject to the
risk of lawsuits by buyers, due to omissions and misstatements, under
the securities law.
1.

SoftBank

About three years ago SoftBank started raising money for its
$100 billion Vision Fund.129 Due to its extra-large size and aggressive
mega-deals,130 Vision Fund has been making headlines ever since.131
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Vision Fund is much larger than “any other tech fund on the planet.”132
The fund is backed by both internal and external investors, including
Apple, Sharp, and Saudi Arabia's PIF SWF.133
Softbank is changing the private ordering arrangements
between VC firms and startups. The question is how pervasive is the
disruption? Softbank’s late stage mega deals not only provide unicorns
with large amounts of capital for capital formation and growth, but also
transform the U.S. VC world.134 In order to compete with Softbank’s
mega deals of $100 million or more, many U.S. VC funds are either
syndicating, raising large amounts of capital or breaking up.135
Initially, it was reported that the SoftBank’s Vision Fund
(“SVF”) is structured like a VC fund, but now it is reported that it is
structured like a private equity (“PE”) fund. There are several
differences between private equity firms and VC funds. The main one
is that PE invest using cash and debt, whereas VCs invest using equity.
It is clear that the SVFs structure is unique due to the following reasons.
According to reports, the fund managers are compensated using
management fees and carried interest, as explained below.136
Additionally, the GP collects 1% management fees and a 20%
performance fee (on all returns over 8%).137
The following structure is different than traditional PE
structures in that 60% of the assets of SVF are held in the form of
common shares (Class A), and the other 40% are in the form of
preferred shares (Class B).138 In order to attract outside investors, as
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LPs, SoftBank has agreed to reward them with a fixed 7% coupon,
which is not tied to the performance of SVF’s assets.139
Following the WeWork IPO failure, there is a concern among
academics and the press that SVF negotiated for aggressive contractual
provisions, IPO ratchets or other anti-dilution provisions, which will be
triggered in an event of a low valuation following an IPO (compared to
the large round of financing).140 The idea is that SVF negotiated for a
downside protection that is very large due to the outsized amount of
money that it invests in portfolio companies (to protect its investments).
There is a need to conduct more investigations on this, especially
compared to other unicorns that recently went public.
Second, most traditional VC funds do not have a nationwide
presence, and are frequently organized as small partnerships.141 They
are “hands on” investors who monitor their investments very closely.142
They provide mentoring and management services for the startups that
they invest in, such as accounting, networking, finding partners,
investors and even new management.143 Therefore, VC funds usually
prefer to invest in startups that are close to their geographic location,
which allows them to provide services more easily (there are exceptions
– Israel).144
VCs offer “optimal services” to an entrepreneurial firm that is
positioned within the fund’s concentrated industry, which is usually
very narrowly defined.145 SoftBank is investing very broadly, ranging
from “artificial intelligence and machine learning to optimize every
industry that affects our lives—from real estate to food to
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transportation.”146 The changes to market structures as a result of
SoftBank’s aggressive investment strategy in unicorns and hightechnology goods can reduce significantly the ability of other new
firms to grow in size and scope.147
Third, there are mixed reports on monitoring the management
and appointing directors to the board of directors. Some claim that SVF
tries to influence the management and board of directors of the
companies that it invests in. See more on SoftBank’s investment148 in
WeWork below. Others claim that SVF does not care about monitoring
right but rather contracts for downside protection.
Unfortunately, there are mixed reports on SoftBank monitoring
its investments, and whether SoftBank appoints directors to the board
of directors or truly advises portfolio companies on business plan and
strategy. It is not surprising that SoftBank made headlines again when
it considered “spending up to $20 billion for a majority stake
in WeWork.” But, it ended up investing a smaller amount after reports
that “the co-working giant's leadership isn't willing to give up
control.”149 In October 2019, SoftBank ousted Adam Neumann as CEO
and controls over 80% of WeWork.150
Fourth, SoftBank is investing in competing businesses. This
raises the question of whether it requires the startups to waive corporate
opportunity provisions and fiduciary duty doctrines?151 As noted
above, there are several reports on conflict of interests between
SoftBank and LPs, as well as investments in competing technologies.
SoftBank representatives are perhaps serving on boards of multiple
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2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90285552/the-most-powerful-person-insilicon-valley(“The Vision Fund’s minimum investment in startups is $100 million,
and in just over two years since its October 2016 debut, it’s committed more than
$70 billion.”).
147
David C. Mowery & Nathan Rosenberg, The U.S. National Innovation System, in
NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 29 (Richard Nelson ed., 1993).
146

Eliot Brown, SoftBank Scraps $16 Billion Plan to Buy Most of WeWork, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/softbank-scraps-16-billion-plan-tobuy-most-of-wework-11546905398.
149
Liz Hoffman, Eliot Brown & Maureen Farrell, SoftBank’s Biggest Backers Balk at
Planned $16 Billion Acquisition of WeWork, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/softbank-finds-limits-to-its-love-for-wework-asinvestors-push-back-11545225988.
150
Annie Palmer & Christine Wang, SoftBank Takes 80% Ownership of WeWork,
Announces $5 Billion in New Financing Package, CNBC (Oct. 22, 2019, 9:52 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/23/softbank-to-take-control-of-wework.html.
151
See Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of
Loyalty: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV.
1075 (2017).
148

33

portfolio companies. This is a common practice among VC and PE fund
representatives. It is also common that portfolio companies will
compete, operate in the same line of business, or even share what is
considered proprietary information (including business partners,
customers or employees).
This sort of behavior raises not only concerns about potential
anti-competitive behavior of SoftBank, but also requires companies to
abandon corporate fiduciary duties, which affect private ordering. For
example, there are rumors of consolidation in many industries as a
result of direct SoftBank investments. For example, the ride-hailing
businesses are consolidated as a direct result of the SoftBank
investments. TechCrunch and Recode reported that Uber engaged in
anti-competitive arrangements with Grab in Southeast Asia as a direct
result of the PIF and SoftBank investments in Uber.152
Southeast Asia is considered a growth market due to its
“population of over 600 million people, many of whom are coming
online for the first time, but it is also considered a loss-making market
for new industries like ride-sharing — particularly when two
companies are locked in a subsidies war.”153 Uber, which had presence
in eight countries in Southeast Asia, agreed to sell to the local rival
Grab, which is also owned by PIF and SoftBank. It was further reported
that Uber got “a 27.5 percent stake in Grab and Uber CEO Dara
Khosrowshahi will join Grab’s board.”154 The Singapore antitrust
agency levied $9.5 million in fines on Uber and Grab, accusing Grab
of using its “position as market leader to unfairly raise fares after the
Uber exit.” Uber and Grab are not the only car sharing companies,
Softbank also invested in Chinese Didi Chuxing, using its Delta
Fund.155 Antitrust analysis is outside the scope of this Article, but there
are several scholars who are currently trying to track these
developments and are concerned about its effects.156
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Fifth, some commentators are accusing SoftBank for not
pursuing strictly financial objectives, but also for having strategic ones
because of its main investors. For example, PIF is one of the largest
investors in SoftBank’s Vision Fund. Commentators suggest that PIF
perhaps uses Softbank in order to invest in leading startups indirectly
(PIF invested in 50 or 60 tech companies through SoftBank).157 PIF
recently declared that it will make another investment of $45 billion to
establish another fund Vision Fund II.158
Finally, some VCs expressed concern about the entrance of new
nontraditional foreign players who are investing directly in the
market,159 and their adverse effect on the traditional startup funding
model,160 which is discussed below. Other VCs (and the NVCA) are
concerned about the new powers of the U.S. government to scrutinize
the investments of foreign strategic investors, which is discussed
below.
2.

Corporate Venture Capital

In recent years, many large U.S. firms have halted some of their
internal research and development efforts due to short-termism and
shareholder supremacy,161 which has led to a revival in another
alternative investment vehicle, referred to by economists as “corporate
venture capital or CVC.”162 In the first half of 2021, startups in the
United States raised over $79 billion from CVC investors.163
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CVC is used to describe an “investment of corporate funds
directly in external start-up companies”, according to Chesbrough.164
The CVC vehicle is an equity investment (sponsorship) in an
entrepreneurial firm by an established firm.165 Large corporations are
using CVC investments in order to compete in an ever-changing
technology market where new technologies and business models
constantly disrupt their existing businesses.166
More than 1,600 corporations have CVC programs worldwide,
including Google Ventures (GV)167 and Microsoft’s M12,168 according
to the 2017 Thelander-PitchBook Investment Firm Compensation
Report.169 In the past, many of the CVC investment efforts in high
growth companies usually ended up in dissolution or failure of the CVC
arm,170 perhaps due to the significant differences between an
investment by a CVC vehicle and a traditional VC. The following
compares between VC and CVC models, including incentive structures
and compensation of CVC investors.
There are many differences between VC and CVC investment
vehicles.171 First, and foremost, the VC manages her fund from a
See Henry W. Chesbrough, Making Sense of Corporate Venture Capital, HARV. BUS.
REV., Mar. 2002, https://hbr.org/2002/03/making-sense-of-corporate-venturecapital/ar/1.
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Cumming
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return-on-investment stance, whereas the CVC manager is required to
successfully achieve a blend of financial and strategic goals.172 VCs
mainly invest for financial purposes, whereas CVCs might have other,
strategic purposes.
In the event that the corporation has difficulty with directing its
CVCs on the objectives of the potential investment (financial versus
strategic goals), then the CVCs will be inclined to not follow through
and pull the plug on the investment.173 For example, if the CVC is not
invested in acquiring the complementary technology. Additionally,
CVCs do not enjoy the same kind of longevity that VCs enjoy; their
lifespan is significantly shorter and much more volatile.174
Second, typically most large corporations do not have the “VC
like” dedication to their portfolio companies, or the expertise to deal
with such investment.175 According to an Earnst & Young study,176
large corporations don’t select the investment opportunities alone, but
rather piggyback and form syndicates with renowned VC funds in order
to select the startups.177
There is a negative spillover effect when the startup firm in
question has a competing (or adjacent) technology to the established
firms.178 Empirically, in cases with direct competition between the
startup and the CVC firm, the startup retains more board seats for itself
and is reluctant to award board power to the CVC investors.179
Strategically, however, CVC investors might be more interested in
investing in competing technologies, even though the CVC will
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(2009),
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/SGM_VC_
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conceivably be more successful with investments in complementary
technologies.180
Third, the governance structures, compensation and other
incentive mechanisms of CVC vehicles are distinctive, and not always
efficient in incentivizing the division managers to maximize profits.181
The decision to use a subsidiary structure for the CVC, rather
than the limited partnership (which is used by traditional VC) also
makes a significant difference.182 General partners in a VC limited
partnership usually have an incentive to maximize profits, whereas
managers of a subsidiary of the CVC are usually characterized by riskaverse behavior.183 A contributing factor is the structure of
management performance fees. VCs are experts in tying a manager’s
salary to her performance,184 whereas in many cases CVCs do not tie
the manager’s performance to her salary (instead the manager fee is
included in the corporate fee-structure plans).185 That is why many
CVCs experience the revolving door problem,186 where senior
managers frequently leave.187
Fourth, investment strategies also differ with regards to
specialization, diversification and timing. CVC funds are traditionally
less diversified and encompass a narrow ground of operation
(specialization), as their spheres are essentially determined by the
parent company’s operations.188
If, for any reason, the CVC fund decided not to partake in
subsequent financing rounds, they could transform their investment
from a strategic participation into a mere financial investment. The
existence of “pay-to-play provisions” (provisions that punish investors
that do not participate in their full pro-rata percentage of the financing)
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could oblige the CVC fund to convert their preferred shares into
common shares, essentially forfeiting their privileges.189
The participation of CVC investors affects the private ordering
between VC investors and founders, allowing the founders to demand
founder friendly investment rounds. They not only contribute to the
changes in contractual terms in the traditional VC financing documents
but can also lead to conflicts of interest.190
SoftBank’s model departs from the traditional CVC model.
Most CVC funds are only accountable to their parent corporation’s
strategic desires, because they rely on the parent corporation for
funding. Whereas SoftBank has recently been raising money from
outside investors. It is deploying outside money with its own capital,
and perhaps takes other interests into account.191

3.

Sovereign Wealth

SWFs are completely different investment vehicles than private
entities, such as VCs. SWFs are formed by numerous types of
governments, ranging from autocratic to democratic, in order to
manage resources (savings and investments) for future generations.192
As detailed below, there are different types and structures of SWF
investment vehicles, varying from independent financial institutions to
central banks. 193 There is controversy among academics and
policymakers surrounding the opaqueness (lack of transparency) of
See id.
See Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private Economy
57 B.C. L. Rev. 583 (2016).
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these funds, their extra-large size, possible non-commercial nonfinancial goals, and potential influence over the financial stability of
their target nations.194
Foreign actors and governments are directly investing in
unicorns using SWF vehicles, by accumulating large stakes in purely
private entities that once were solely in the domain of specialized VC
investors. Many commentators, such as Edwin Truman, a former
assistant U.S. Treasury secretary, are concerned about these trends,
stating that: “This characteristic is unnerving and disquieting. It calls
into question our most basic assumptions about the structure and
functioning of our economies and the international financial
system.”195
From Asia to oil rich Middle Eastern and European countries,196
the number of SWFs assets under management is estimated at $9
trillion.197 In the past, SWFs didn’t invest in risky tech ventures. The
new investment trend in unicorn firms represents a shift in SWFs
investment strategy and ordinary risk profile, “from real, safe assets to
the frontiers of venture capital.”198
The changes in investment strategies of SWFs can be the result
of several factors, according to Engel, Hamirani and Saklatvala. First,
unicorns and tech companies are perceived as having high growth
See Sofia Johan, April M. Knill & Nathan Mauck, Determinants of Sovereign Wealth
Fund Investment in Private Equity (TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2010-044, 2011),
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potential. Second, SWFs are able to diversify their portfolio, which
traditionally comprised of traditional conservative investments to
“idiosyncratic growth drivers.” Finally, an investment in innovative
technology can affect not only their entire portfolio, but perhaps can
help stimulate their local economies.
One of the most significant developments is that some SWFs
are changing not only the types of assets that they invest in, but also the
patterns of investment. Despite the lack of transparency in their
operations and strategies, there are recent news reports on cases where
SWFs changed their investment patterns altogether, from passive to
active (direct participation) investments.199
A “direct” SWF
investment is referred to as a situation where the SWF invests in the
securities of a private firm directly and not passively using a separate
investment vehicle, such as a private equity fund. Until recently, SWFs
invested passively as limited partners (LPs) in tech companies, using
the help of professional money managers, i.e., private equity funds
(PEs) or VCs to do the investments for them.
These developments raise several questions. First, what is the
role that governments play in the innovation process and in managing
wealth for future generations? Throughout U.S. history, the
government has played the role of catalyst and even venture capitalist
to promote innovation, technological research, development, and
commercialization.200 As described in detail below, U.S. policymakers
are concerned when foreign governments are directly intervening,
“playing” in the U.S. high-growth technology, innovation and
industrial spheres. This raises the question of whether foreign
governments are deliberately interfering in the U.S. innovation process
for political reasons. There are also redistribution geopolitical issues.
According to Ang, the rise of SWFs is perhaps meant to redistribute
wealth from the West to the East.201
SWFs are distinct from VCs and other types of investment
funds. First, they report directly to their sovereign states and are not
subject to any financial scrutiny from other investors. Second, they
have different legal structures and management styles, depending on
their origin. Third, it is not clear if they have to comply with any
regulations or reporting requirements. It depends on the laws and
regulations of the sovereign state that appoints their managers or
members of the SWF board of directors. Fourth, they might have nonSee McCahery & de Roode, supra note 177.
See Constance E. Bagley & Anat Alon-Beck, Preparing for the Apocalypse: A MultiProng Proposal to Develop Countermeasures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
and Nuclear Threats, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 823 (2018).
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financial objectives, such as increasing their political influence by
making investments overseas.202
Fifth, they are usually long-term investors, and share the goals
of preserving the wealth of the sovereign nation for future use. Sixth,
they frequently acquire large stakes in the target firms. Seventh, they
have flexibility in choosing their investments. Finally, it is not clear if
SWFs have the ability or desire to monitor their investments, because
it will depend on whether the SWF chooses to take control rights using
contractual mechanisms, such as voting rights or observation or board
seats.
It is also important to distinguish between a passive investment
by a SWF and the new trend of a hybrid or direct active investment. It
seems that western governments and policymakers are not as concerned
if SWF investments are passive (as LPs). If, however, the SWFs are
active and starting to act like VCs by intervening in the market directly,
then the question is whether SWFs can succeed, capitalize on their
investments, recruit the right talent and source suitable deals.203 Due to
the fact that SWFs are very different from VC funds, it is hard to
compare between the management style and incentive structures of
these vehicles, especially due to lack of information and overall
opaqueness.
SWF investments in unicorns change the traditional VC
investment patterns and affect private ordering because of the massive
deployment of capital into the hands of founders (agency cost). By
joining late stage investment rounds, they contribute to high valuations
and cause the companies to stay private longer, which can contribute to
volatility and inaccurate pricing.204 In terms of corporate governance,
more research needs to be done, in order to determine whether SWFs
are bargaining for any control rights. Due to the geopolitical nature of
these investments, the following is an account of why U.S. and other
Western policymakers are concerned about these developments.205
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SWFs are not only growing rapidly in size and number,206 but
as noted are also changing their investment strategy by directly
investing in unicorns. They are doing so by opening offices in Palo
Alto, forming joint ventures with other investment funds, and coinvesting as general partners (GPs) alongside PEs (not merely as
LPs).207 They are also accused of “hunting unicorns”208 due to news
reports of hiring and stuffing their offices with experienced Western
dealmakers that are charged with directly investing in these firms.
There is a heated debate on whether the U.S. government
should regulate or limit certain investments in entrepreneurial highgrowth and high-tech startup firms, and the impact of such an effort on
our economy.209 SWFs pose many challenges for U.S. regulators.210
There is a concern that SWFs are ultimately controlled by foreign
governments and therefore their managers can take non-financial
measures into account, such as political and strategic.
The national security concerns are that SWFs may use their
economic influence to obtain critical sensitive information from the
companies that they invest in (tunneling), transfer jobs or assets abroad
to their home country, or even compromise the operation of
strategically important companies.211

C.

Special Purpose Vehicles

Even with the increases in thresholds and removal of employees
from their count under the JOBS Act, companies still found themselves
bumping against them. As a result, companies found the need to layer
their capital, using further count reducing methods of raising capital
from investors. The method of choice for most was a special purpose
See Kratsas & Truby, supra note 185.
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vehicle. These SPVs (also known as special purpose entities), typically
structured as limited partnerships or limited liability companies
(“LLCs”), allow for investments to be pooled into a shell company.212
The shell company is the nominal owner, with the investors in the shell
being the ultimate beneficiaries.
Under normal circumstances, a company formed for the
purpose of acquiring and holding assets as investments would be
required to register under Section 3 of the Investment Company Act
(“ICA”) of 1940.213 However, nearly all SPVs rely upon one of three
exclusions under the ICA and its corresponding rules.214 The most
common is an exclusion under Rule 3a-7, whereby the SPV would be
excluded as an issuer who does not issue redeemable securities.215
Instead, the SPV holds the assets and simply generates a cash flow out
to its owners. Because of the simplicity of its purpose, it “[conducts]
no business and [has] no need for employees or management
structures.”216
By structuring an investment into a private company as an SPV,
the number of owners decreases from potentially hundreds down to a
single entity. It is typical that wealthy, sophisticated investors are the
financial backers of such vehicles. These investors are capable and
willing to write checks in excess of $500,000 to join these SPVs set up
by venture funds.217
It also opens the door for investors who would not normally
have the access to make investments in these markets. By pooling their
assets, smaller retail investors can combine their assets to invest in
riskier, private companies. By capitalizing an SPV with a fundraising
round under an exemption like Regulation Crowdfunding (“Reg CF”),
investments can be garnered in any amount from any investor. Reg CF
was originally passed as part of the JOBS Act with an annual limit of
$1 million with annual adjustments for inflation.218 However, in 2020,
the SEC raised these limits to $5 million annually over the objections
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of Commissioners Lee and Crenshaw.219 We are now seeing companies
conduct Reg CF rounds via SPVs and overtly stating they did so
because of the Section 12(g) limits.220
According to Mercury, the new regulations coincided with their
Series B fundraise and made it easier for Mercury to run a community
round. Mercury was able to use the same subscription agreement for
both types of investors: their community round and their other
accredited Series B investors. Mercury used the SPV to group
community-round investors on a single line on their cap table.221 This
allowed them to raise capital from approximately 2,500 investors
without risking the 12(g) thresholds. Given that the average investment
was $2,000 and that nearly 30% of the investments were less than $500,
it is logical to assume the majority of investors were unaccredited.
Without an SPV, it is likely the company would have crossed each
12(g) threshold independently.
Another important development is that the SPV also helped
Mercury to streamline their communications to investors. Specifically,
it allowed Mercury to communicate with a single point of contact—the
lead investor of their community round, Sahil Lavingia, CEO of
ecommerce platform Gumroad. It should be noted that Gumroad was
the first company to take advantage of the new crowdfunding rule,
raising $5M in March 2021.222
SPVs are not new in the buyout world. The voice chat app
Clubhouse raised $100 million via an SPV in 2021.223 Other publicized
examples include data analytics company Palantir Technologies,224
which used SPVs to raise more than $1 billion and the grocery delivery
platform Instacart.225 UiPath, which went public with over 3,700
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shareholders of record, was partially owned by an LLC known only as
UiPath Angels, LLC. We were only able to track these entities down
after hand reviewing numerous SEC filings and using the related names
to draw conclusions.
It must be noted that the investors in these funds are not
assembling them. If you are an established venture capital firm, like
Anderseen Horowitz or FirstMark Capital or a known investment bank,
like a JP Morgan or Goldman Sachs, you are probably creating SPVs
for your clients. If an established VC fund is behind it, an SPV can be
created in a matter of days, and usually targets accredited investors,
such as institutional investors, friends or business associates of the fund
managers. They also give alternative venture capital (AVC) market
actors exclusive access and ability to invest in well-known private
companies.
They are also significantly easier to disguise as ordinary LLCs
or LPs that these venture capital funds normally use to limit their
liability and manage their various holdings. If Sequoia Capital or
SoftBank’s Vision Fund assembles an SPV and names it generically, it
joins the dozens of entities in existence hiding behind LLC and LP
secrecy laws. SVF Fast (Cayman) Ltd. held over 50 million shares of
DoorDash went it went public in 2021.226 This limited company created
offshore was itself owned by another LP which itself is owned by the
full SoftBank Vision Fund. Sequoia Capital often chooses to name their
entities even more generally with such examples as “Sequoia Capital
Global Growth Fund II, L.P.”, “Sequoia Capital U.S. Global Growth
Fund VII, L.P.”, and “Sequoia Capital Global Growth II Principals
Fund, L.P.”, all of which significant combined holdings in
DoorDash.227 By using the classification of “affiliated” entities, the VC
funds can set up SPVs alongside their own investments to conceal who
is really behind the funding and the purpose for the structure.
There can be several reasons for structuring a two-part deal like
this. First, the SPV investors may want to cut the middleman (VC) and
invest directly in the startup. It allows AVCs to make a single
investment through a vehicle that is created for that sole purpose,
without having to invest for a longer term in multiple firms through a
traditional fund. It also reduces the fee structure often associated with
investing in a VC fund. Despite them doing the initial groundwork to
create and capitalize the SPV, the VC is likely not participating in any
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active management of the SPV’s investment outside their role in
managing their own investment.
Regardless of whether the investment occurs alongside a VC,
there are still other reasons SPVs are sought after. In addition to the
aforementioned advantage of allowing companies to keep their cap
record counts low, it allows venture capitalist to join the party and
invest large sums directly if they choose to do so. SPV funds allow VCs
to invest more money in the short term, rather than committing to a
long term diversified fund. Second, it allows investment bankers to get
the startup to pick them as a lead underwriter when they decide to do
an IPO. Finally, other benefits include no need for financials, no need
for capital calls, no management fees (or management company) or low
fees, up to 250 accredited investors can invest without triggering the
registration requirement, allows for comparatively small investment
minimums, a deal-by-deal carry228, the empowerment of high-volume
investment syndicates, and keeps the startup cap tables (also known as
capitalization tables or ledgers) clean.
A cap table is a table or spread sheet which details all the equity
holdings of the participating members/shareholders/investors. The cap
table for an SPV needs to list all of the entity’s participating investors
and their relevant information. This cap table will be used and referred
to frequently throughout the lifecycle of the SPV. The cap table is a
requirement to ensure proper record keeping and–more to the point–to
enable that they pay federal and state taxes and make distributions to
participating investors. The startup founders love SPV structures
because they allow them to raise large sums very quickly.
Of course, there are downsides to such a structure. The SPV
fund is structure for the purpose of investing in a unicorn firm, where
it is hard to value its assets.229 Since valuations can be disputed, it is
important to make sure that SPV fund managers will not have
incentives to distort such reported valuations, especially if they need to
use reports in order to make decisions on commitments for subsequent

“The compensation norm for smaller VC SPVs is around 1/10 (1% management
fee per year and 10% carry.) The carry is ‘deal carry’ which is much more valuable
than fund carry, since the individual losers are not netted against each of the
winners.” John Backus, Should You Co-Invest? 10 Considerations for Co-Investment
SPVs, FINANCIAL POISE (June 12, 2021), https://www.financialpoise.com/coinvestment-spvs/.
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funds.230 Because it is more akin to direct investing, rather than
investing in a fund, the losses will be felt more acutely.231
There is always a possibility that SPV managers will overstate
their portfolio net asset values (NAVs) in an attempt to attract investors
to future funds.232
The assets that the fund will invest in are private,
and there is no liquid market for these assets.233 There is no
diversification.
Another concern is with regards to fees. There is a possibility that
fund managers will fail to fully inform investors about their benefits
from fees. It is very important to design a policy that will take this into
account and protect retail investors from illegal fee practices.
With regard to illiquidity concerns and unicorns, note that unicorn
shares are non-liquid financial assets. Some unicorns allow investors to
trade their shares on secondary markets, but many put restrictions and
do not allow trading in order to comply with our securities laws.234 As
noted by Gornall and Strabulaev, there is also controversy with regards
to aggressive valuations of these firms.235

V.

GOING DARK

The explosive growth of private markets is the most important
development in securities markets in the new millennium, according to
Commissioner Lee.236 The shift in equities in the United States from
public markets to private markets has significant implications for
different stakeholder groups. As companies continue to stay private
longer and raise more capital in private markets, our regulators are
pressured into changing the current trend. There are two main
Id.
Loizos, supra note 197.
232 See, e.g., Karen Kroll, SEC Turns Up the Heat on Private Equity, Hedge Funds,
COMPLIANCE WK. (Mar. 5, 2012), https://www.complianceweek.com/sec-turns-upthe-heat-on-private-equity-hedge-funds/4328.article; see also Peter Lattman,
Private Equity Industry Attracts S.E.C. Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Feb. 12, 2012,
9:15 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/12/private-equity-industryattracts-s-e-c-scrutiny/.
233 Brown, Gredil & Kaplan, supra note 207, at 267–68.
234 See Alon-Beck, supra note 55, at 172–74.
235 William Gornall & Ilya Strebulaev, Squaring Venture Capital Valuations with
Reality (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 23895, 2017). See also,
McCahery & de Roode.
236 Allison Herren Lee, Commissioner, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Going Dark: The
Growth of Private Markets and the Impact on Investors and the Economy (Oct. 12,
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approaches that regulators take, eighter democratizing access of retail
investors to private markets or forcing private companies into public
markets.

A.

The Growth of Private Markets

Legal and regulatory structures influence the shift in equities
from public markets to private markets. While the amendments to the
’34 Act were implemented ostensibly to encourage capital formation,
there was considerable lobbying by major tech companies who were
rapidly approaching the limits, or in the case of some, already over
these limits. Facebook, one of the largest IPOs in history, went public
before the JOBS Act limits went into effect with more than double the
number of allowed shareholders.237 WorkDay, which went public
shortly after the limits went into effect would have been in violation
had the increase not occurred.238 LinkedIn, who went public in late
2011, initially filed under the limit, but the ultimately effective
registration statement was in excess of the existing limits.239 They even
noted in their registration statement that “[t]he actual number of
stockholders is greater than this number of record holders, and includes
stock holders who are beneficial owners, but whose shares are held in
street name by brokers and other nominees.”240
After the passage of the JOBS Act, the limits allowed
companies to stay private longer. However, we are now seeing
companies going public in violation of the new higher limits. Palantir
upon their IPO via direct listing had nearly 2800 shareholders of
record.241 As companies continue to stay private longer and grow even
larger with continued rounds of capital raising, it is likely this is to be
an increasingly common occurrence.
Facebook
(now
Meta
Platforms)
S-1/A,
Mar.
27,
2012,
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001326801/000119312512134663/
d287954ds1a.htm.
238 WorkDay, Inc., Pre-Effective Amendment No. 3 to Form S-1,
Registration
Statement
111
(Form
S-1/A)
(Oct.
11,
2012)
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001327811/000119312512420693/
d385110ds1a.htm#toc385110_16.
239 LinkedIn Corp., Amendment No. 2 to Form S-1, Registration Statement 35 (Form
S-1/A)
(Nov.
16,
2011)
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1271024/000119312511314369/d25
0692ds1a.htm.
240 Id.
241 Palantir Techs. Inc., Amendment No. 5 to Form S-1, Registration Statement 217
(Form
S-1/A)
(Sept.
21,
2020)
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1321655/000119312520249544/d90
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For decades, debate has raged on whether we should ever force
a company to join the public markets and at what point the line for
obligation is crossed. Congress and the SEC have recognized that once
this genie is let out the proverbial lamp, there is no going back. Instead
of pulling the cork, regulators have instead adopted the carrot and the
stick approach of gently nudging companies in the direction of the path
countless firms have taken on their own accord: an IPO.
There are a variety of reasons for these companies to complete
an IPO.242 Capital formation and providing liquidity for existing
shareholders are the obvious reasons.243 There is considerable prestige
associated with being a publicly traded company.244 Finally,
subsequent efforts in capital formation were now generally considered
easier given the access to public investors an IPO granted.245
However, with the dramatic acceleration of capital formation in
private markets over the last two decades, as well as slackening in
regulatory requirements, much of the reason to go public has
evaporated. The policy changes enacted under the JOBS Act, SOX, and
others have resulted in a self-defeating regulatory arc.246 As disclosure
obligations increase for public companies, private markets have been
largely deregulated in the hopes of jumpstarting capital formation.247
Yet, there is no indication that such a policy goal was ever in need of
addressing.
Capital formation in the private markets is considerably easier
and is preferred for a variety of reasons by large private firms.248 No
longer do these firms, predominantly unicorns or soon-to-be unicorns,
need access to the public’s capital to continue their growth. The
creation of secondary markets and increasingly sophisticated exit
mechanisms negotiated by large institutional investors have decreased
the attraction of liquidity mechanisms for many of the shareholder
base.249 Finally, the consolidation of ownership of equity in the United
States into largely institutional holders has diminished the prestige
associated with going public. Companies who go public may very well
find their overall ownership changes only minimally following an IPO.

Rodrigues, supra note 30, at 1544-45.
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244 Id. at 1554.
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246 Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation of Private Capital and the Decline of
Public Companies, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 445, 451 (2017).
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249 See generally Alon-Beck, supra note 18.
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Of course, for minority shareholders, particularly employees,
the liquidity an IPO provides is still desperately sought after. The
restrictions they face associated with their stock options and equity
grants often serve as an increasingly tightening pair of “golden
handcuffs.”250
Given the access to the capital necessary for these companies to
grow found in the private markets, the downsides of going public are
thrust to the forefront. There are very real direct and indirect costs
associated with going public.251 Companies face the large accounting,
auditing, and legal expenses necessary to comply with the ’34 Act
requirements and SEC proxy regulations.252 The indirect costs are often
even greater, with heightened exposure to liability, increases in D&O
insurance costs, public scrutiny, and the distractions to the leadership
of the firm associated with all of these.253 For founders and majority
shareholders, it throws open the door for costly proxy fights and
increases the chance of takeover bids from which there is little hope to
recover the control they have become accustomed to.254
With the lack of a need for access to public markets and the
increased emphasis placed on the negatives associated with being
public, it is no wonder there has been a dramatic downturn in IPOs over
the last 40 years. According to research by Gao, Ritter, and Zhu, the
average number of IPOs from 1980 to 2000 hovered at just over 300
per year.255 Between 2001 and 2012, that number has fallen to just 99
per year, with significant drops for smaller firms.256 For the last two
years, the number has accelerated to record levels with 480 in 2020 and
over 1000 so far in 2021.257 However, this number is driven
overwhelmingly by the volume of Special Purpose Acquisition
Companies (“SPACs”) entering the market.258 The sheer number of
these companies searching within an increasingly limited pool of
potential targets is a further indicator of the easy access to large
amounts of capital.
See generally Alon-Beck, supra note 18.
William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Birth of 144A Equity Offerings, 56 UCLA L. REV. 409,
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255 Xiaohui Gao, Jay R. Ritter & Zhongyan Zhu, Where Have All the IPOs Gone? 2 (Aug.
26, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1954788.
256 Id.
257 IPO Statistics, STOCK ANALYSIS, https://stockanalysis.com/ipos/statistics/ (last
visited Jan. 25, 2022).
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As a result, the desire to avoid these negatives for many firms
far outweighs the positives of conducting an IPO. The question for
management then shifts from when and how to prepare the company
for an IPO to the methods necessary to prevent the need to conduct one
from ever arising. If capital formation is no longer an issue and access
to public equity is no longer needed, regulatory thresholds effectively
requiring companies to make public disclosures is the last hurtle to
staying dark. Clearly, for firms of any consequential size, the $10
million asset threshold is effectively irrelevant, especially when viewed
in the context of the listing requirements on any national stock
exchange. Thus, the only relevant position would be the shareholder of
record thresholds, the true target of the amendments of the JOBS Act.

B.

The Impact on Investors and the Economy

The current market trends are affecting policymakers,
shareholders, investors, employees, markets, and the public at large.
Private markets are plagued with asymmetric information, illiquidity,
and long holding periods. This needs to be take into account in any
serious policy response.
The transparency associated with public markets only remains
effective so long as a sufficient number of firms actually participate in
public markets. As these numbers fall, the transparency of public
markets will diminish.259 Instead, opacity will once again become the
norm in equity markets, likely causing a diminishment of support for
the corporate sector in the long term. However, regulators and the
market itself will more likely require public market-like disclosures to
come into the private markets as more public capital flows into it. As
its role in capital formation begins to accelerate and influence our
corporate world in ways which exceed public markets, it will face
significant pressure from both to give some degree of transparency. We
see this already with increased disclosure requirements on OTC
markets being implemented in 1999 and renewed efforts now to push
for increased transparency during the Biden Administration.
No one denies that there are benefits associated with both public
and private capital markets. Indeed, the ability to seek capital from
either has facilitated decades of economic growth. The fact that the
financing for intangible assets is better sourced from private markets is
a reality any regulator will be faced with when attempting to broaden
disclosure requirements.

Craig Doidge, Kathleen M. Kahle, G. Andrew Karolyi & René M. Stulz, Eclipse of the
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Nonetheless, as more money from an increasing variety of
sources flows in, there must be some degree of protection implemented
to ensure investors of all sophistication can make informed decisions.
To maintain support for our corporate sector, the transparency of
private markets must increase as society’s access increases to them.
First, regulators should enhance not reduce disclosure standards
and investor protections. Initially, our securities laws were designed to
protect all investors, including employees as investors. That meant that
all the companies in the United States were required to disclose
financial and other information about the offering firm, prior to offering
securities to the public. Our laws, specifically the Securities Act of
1933 (the “Securities Act”), required that a company that offers to sell
its securities must first register the securities with the SEC. During the
registration process, the issuing company disclosed certain facts,
including certified financial statements, a description of its assets and
business operations, management composition and more.
One of the largest sources of pressure to go public came from
the largest group of minority shareholders: the firm’s own employees.
Things changed. Startups today enjoy several exemptions from
registration. Thanks to a series of reforms to the federal securities laws,
which began in 1988.260 The following changes dramatically reduced
the ability for this group to pressure for an IPO. First, with the passage
of the JOBS Act in 2012, Section 12(g) of the ’34 Act was amended to
increase the number of shareholders of record a company was permitted
to have from 500 persons to 2000 persons.261 Second, the ’34 Act was
further amended to remove employees who received shares as part of
exempt employee compensation plans from the shareholder of record
count.262
There is consensus that there is a need for more disclosure.
However, there is also debate on what information should private
companies disclose to alleviate this problem. There are several
approaches to disclosure. According to Yifat Aran, they include a
maximalist, minimalist, and intermediate approach.263 One thing is
260
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clear though, we need a better disclosure regime to “prevent the market
for equity-based compensation from becoming a market for lemons.”264
Aran warns that employees will lose trust in equity compensation
arrangements. This is already happening, as evident from employees
complaining on public platforms such as Glassdoors and PaySa.265
Some employees as shareholders turn to the courts for help.
Other stakeholders affected by the high private market demand
include retail investors and the public at large. There is pressure on
deal valuations. The rise in dry powder, along with reported and
perceived reductions in illiquidity premiums, suggests a market that
may be overheating.
Despite the fact that the institutional investor base has longterm liabilities, private company assets are highly illiquid. These
investors might face issues with short-term cash flow obligations in the
event that the private markets will enter a negative downturn
correction. Note that some institutional funds have restrictive
requirements, such as maintaining daily liquidity requirements.
There is a need to examine the systemic implications of
growing private market exposure among institutional investors such as
pension funds. There is a rise in exposure of AVC investors to private
markets, such as sovereign wealth funds, government plan sponsors,
pension funds. Their exposure affects the end users, the investors that
our securities laws are supposed to protect, the savers and retirees.

VI.

SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM

Given the high thresholds and the penchant for companies to
avoid them through commonly accepted methods of business, there is
a growing call for reform on Section 12(g) to restore it to its original
purpose: ensuring investors are protected when companies reach a
approach to the regulation of disclosures to start-up employees. See Yifat Aran,
Making Disclosure Work for Start-Up Employees, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 867 (2019).
264 See Alon-Beck, supra note 55. See also Aran, supra note 241.
265 These sites rank the “Best Companies to Work For” and employees pay “careful
attention . . . to Employee Engagement Scores that link corporate reputation,
employee motivation, and productivity.” Judy Samuelson, Why Do We Still Call It
Capitalism?, QUARTZ (Apr. 9, 2018), https://work.qz.com/1247835/spotifys-iposhould-make-us-consider-why-we-still-use-the-term-capitalism/.
Unicorn
employee complaints are not private anymore, as the “conversation has moved to
employee hangouts, both virtual and real, to interview rooms on college campuses,
and to public conversations about Board diversity, the glass ceiling, and in the talent
pool.” Id.
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certain level of exposure to the public markets. SEC Chairman Gary
Gensler announced examining Section 12(g) as part of his agenda for
2022 and Commissioner Allison Lee had previously called for such
reforms. It will undoubtedly be an uphill battle with two Republican
commissioners already announcing their opposition to changes which,
in their view, threaten the facilitation of capital formation.
We do not share the views of Commissioners Pierce and
Roisman on this matter. There is no indication that the large companies
which would be most affected by reforms are having any difficulty
seeking capital. Since the passage of the JOBS Act, the number of
unicorns has increased from around a dozen to nearly 1,000 worldwide,
with nearly half being found in the United States. This number
continues to grow nearly exponentially. With more and more money
flowing into our private markets and with greater access being given to
retail investors, we must take active steps to ensure investors are
properly protected.
Potential reforms are wide ranging, with many requiring
Congressional action. Given the divisions we currently face in
Washington, substantial reform is unlikely. However, there are actions
the SEC can take under its independent rule making authority which
would still lead to a bare minimum increase in protective measures. We
will begin by outlining the reforms requiring Congressional approval
and then move on to those under the SEC’s rulemaking power.
Congress should repeal Section 502 of the JOBS Act which
specifically excludes employees who receive shares under an employee
compensation plan from the shareholder of record count. This
provision dramatically undercuts the employees’ ability to pressure
companies to ever go public and further restricts their ability to escape
their golden handcuffs. It also relegates them to a proverbial secondclass status as investors. They are required to make investment
decisions without access to information simply because they are
employees. There is no indication that the average employee is privy to
the inside information necessary for them to make informed choices. In
fact, there are signs that many employees never exercise their options
because of an inability to make that informed choice.266 Congress has
enabled these companies to force employees to gamble with their own
financial future and by doing so removed their power as shareholders.
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Congress should also consider implementing a float-based test
akin to one suggested by Professor John Coffee. Other academics have
long endorsed such a method as being a more accurate reflection of the
public exposure to a company. If there is significant OTC trading
associated with an enterprise, it is indicative that a sufficient portion of
the investing public may have the ability to obtain such shares. By
implementing a provision to include both the expanded shareholder of
record test and the public float test, large private companies who have
long remained private may continue to do so. But companies who are
actively trading, but on smaller secondary markets, cannot escape the
regulatory schemes designed to protect the smaller retail investors who
do not have the leverage or sophistication necessary to obtain
information.
Under its own rulemaking power, the SEC should redefine the
term “held of record” to more accurately reflect those who are making
and benefitting from the investment decision to hold the shares in
question. By redefining the term to reflect those who are actually voting
the shares, the count will better reflect who is really the investor. Even
if the shares are owned under the street name of the beneficial owner’s
broker, the beneficial owner still ultimately receives the proxy
materials and the right to vote their shares. The company is required to
pass the material along to the appropriate shareholders. This is not a
new concept. During the comment stage of rulemaking following the
JOBS Act passage, there were calls for a “proxy count” to be
implemented instead of a “record count” to avoid the reduction in
numbers resulting from street name ownership, SPVs, and other
layering methods.
The implementation of look through efforts would take even
less effort with the passage of the Corporate Transparency Act of 2020,
the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) is now
required to implement a registry of beneficial owners of nearly all
domestic entities formed under state corporate law and foreign entities
registered to do business in the United States. The beneficial owners
are required to report this information and it is expected that broker
dealers will have an obligation to crosscheck information their clients
provide with this registry. While the primary purpose of creating such
a registry is to combat money laundering, tax evasion, and terrorist
financing, it could easily be applied to a broader definition of
shareholder of record.
The SEC should also amend Rule 12g5-1(b)(3) to remove the
“primary” requirement from the catch-all provision of record holder. If
the company knows or has reason to know that a particular method of
ownership is being used to avoid or reduce the record count, the count
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should be reflective of the true beneficial owner. In its 2012 report on
the SEC’s enforcement authority of the anti-circumvention provision,
the SEC itself conceded that the rule “may be applicable only in limited
circumstances.”267
In addition, the SEC should consider modernizing the limits for
accredited investor. The minimum income and net worth requirements
for accreditation status were implemented in 1982 and have not been
adjusted since.268 In that time, the number of households capable of
qualifying for status has increased by more than tenfold.269 On top of
this, the SEC has also expanded the definition to encompass even more
investors who would qualify based on professional credentials, as
opposed to net worth. While many of these individuals would have
qualified already, it still represents a willingness to continue the selfdefeating arc of regulation. The SEC is required to review the definition
every four years under Section 413(b)(2)(A) of Dodd-Frank and the
next review is set to occur in 2023.270
Finally, the SEC should consider narrowing the definition of
employee compensation plan to reflect only equity grants, rather than
stock options. Equity grants are truly compensation in that moment as
outright income. Stock options, on the other hand, are instead the ability
to make an investment decision. The decision to exercise or not,
however, ultimately remains with the employee. By narrowing the
definition, the rule would be more reflective of the term
“compensation” and allow for these employees to be viewed as what
they truly are: minority shareholders.

VII.

CONCLUSION

While our securities laws were implemented to ensure both
smooth capital formation and sufficient investor protection, there must
be a balance sought between them. If one is continually favored, with
the other neglected, the underlying reasoning is defeated. With the
passage of the JOBS Act, capital formation has never been easier. By
any metric, be it size, frequency of deal, or percentage of the market,
exempt offerings have come to play the leading role in this arena.
267
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Because of these exempt offerings, in our view, the Section
12(g) loophole is squarely situated at the point at which capital
formation and investor protection clash. Its thresholds allow companies
to raise capital from numerous investors while avoiding public
disclosure requirements. They are allowed to see tremendous growth at
the expense of good governance, prudent disclosure, and investor
protection. By addressing the threshold requirements under Section
12(g), we believe we can rebalance the equilibrium, provide the
necessary protection to investors, and continue to liberate the markets
to allow for a greater range of participation from a variety of sources.
With the SEC moving to allow retail investors to play a part in
these offerings, both directly and indirectly, it is imperative that we take
the steps necessary to protect their capital. Regulators have a duty to
watch on behalf of all investors, not just those with the loudest voices.
The paradigm of an ordinary investor making a reasonable investment
decision only works if they have the information necessary to make it
an informed one. It is our obligation to ensure that they do and bringing
about change to Section 12(g) is an important step to making this a
reality.
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APPENDIX I
The table below represents the raw data points presented visually
above. Any red highlighted box denotes a company which went public
in violation of the Section 12(g) thresholds at the time of its S-1 filing.
Any orange highlighted box denotes a company which has gone public
since the passage of the JOBS Act and would be in violation of the
previous 500 shareholder of record limit.
Year
May-11
Nov-11
Dec-11
Apr-12
May-12
Oct-12
Nov-13
Mar-14
Jun-14
Oct-14
Dec-14
Dec-14
Jan-15
Mar-15
Aug-15
Sep-15
Oct-15
Nov-15
Jun-16
Sep-16
Oct-16
Mar-17
Jun-17
Sep-17
Nov-17
Mar-18
Apr-18
Jul-18
Dec-18
Mar-19
Apr-19

Company
LinkedIn
Groupon
Zynga
Okta
Facebook
WorkDay
Twitter
Quotient Technology
GoPro
Wayfair
Lending Club
New Relic
Box
MuleSoft
Sunrun
Cloudflare
Pure Storage
Square
NantHealth
Nutanix
Coupa
Snap Inc
Blue Apron
Roku, Inc.
Stitch Fix
DropBox
Pivotal
Bloom Energy
Moderna Therapeutics
Lyft
Pinterest

Shareholders of Record
571
341
200
355
1070
630
755
321
255
116
275
145
810
367
252
313
402
665
426
591
257
305
133
198
247
2658
931
715
484
2301
505
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Apr-19
May-19
Sep-19
Jan-20
Sep-20
Sep-20
Dec-20
Dec-20
Dec-20
Mar-21
Apr-21
Apr-21
Apr-21
Apr-21
Apr-21
May-21
May-21
Jun-21
Jun-21
Jul-21
Jul-21
Sep-21
Sep-21
Sep-21
Oct-21
Oct-21
Oct-21
Oct-21

Slack Technologies
Uber
Peloton
One Medical
JFrog
Palantir
Airbnb
DoorDash
Snowflake
Oscar Health
AppLovin
Coinbase
Compass
Twilio
UiPath
Flywire
Squarespace
Confluent
WalkMe
Duolingo
Robinhood
Amplitude
Freshworks
Toast
AvidXchange
Gitlab
Rent the Runway
Udemy

494
2223
428
308
92
2794
1457
537
1026
461
72
430
414
329
3702
687
1112
607
153
442
1650
334
1178
939
503
612
575
471

